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Centralized and Decentralized Management of Local Common Pool Resources in the 
Developing World: Experimental Evidence from Fishing Communities in Colombia 
 
Abstract: This paper uses experimental data to test for a complementary relationship between 
formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and non-
binding verbal agreements to do the same. Our experiments were conducted in the field in three 
regions of Colombia. Each group of five subjects played 10 rounds of an open access common 
pool resource game, and 10 additional rounds under one of five institutions— communication 
alone, two external regulations that differed by the level of enforcement, and communication 
combined with each of the two regulations. Our results suggest that the hypothesis of a 
complementary relationship between communication and external regulation is supported for 
some combinations of regions and regulations, but cannot be supported in general. We therefore 
conclude that the determination of whether formal regulations and informal communication are 
complementary must be made on a community-by-community basis.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we report the results of a series of common pool resource experiments conducted 
in three regions of Colombia that depend on small-scale fishing. Our field experiments were 
designed to investigate whether regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural 
resource and non-binding verbal agreements within a community to do the same are 
complementary in the sense that a combination of formal regulations and informal community 
agreements lead to greater conservation of a shared local resource than either alone.  
A large literature of experimental research from different disciplines has demonstrated the 
positive welfare effects of simply allowing subjects to communicate with each other in common 
pool resource settings.
1 Communication can be effective because it allows participants to (1) 
share information about the nature of the game, its incentives and decisions that maximize 
group payoffs, (2) coordinate their actions and send signals about intentions, (3) express 
                                                 
1  For recent reviews of the effects of communication in social dilemma experiments see Shankar and Pavit (2002) 
and Cardenas, Ahn and Ostrom (2003).    2
displeasure about undesirable or unacceptable outcomes,  (4) reduce social distance among 
group members, and (5) punish uncooperative behavior, for example, by agreeing not to 
cooperate in future periods if total group harvest exceeds some threshold.   
A smaller literature has looked at the effects of external regulations—fixed quotas with 
some exogenous enforcement apparatus—on behavior in experimental common property 
games. This literature suggests that regulatory controls on the use of common pool resources 
may not be as effective as one would hope. Ostmann (1998) finds that external regulation and 
enforcement financed by experiment participants only reduces harvests by a small amount 
relative to a regulation-free environment. Beckenkamp and Ostmann (1999) report that middle 
levels of sanction lead to a reduction in the exploitation of a common property resource, but 
higher sanctions can cause overuse because subjects may perceive the high sanction to be 
unfair. Cardenas, Stranlund, and Willis (2000) found that a quota supported by weak 
enforcement is effective in initial rounds, but as subjects realize the weak consequences of 
noncompliance the effectiveness of the regulation quickly erodes. Ostrom (2000) discusses how 
enforcement of externally imposed rules may crowd out endogenous cooperative behavior, 
because it may discourage the formation of social norms to solve the dilemma, and at the same 
time may encourage players to cheat the system. 
However, little research has been done to investigate the effects of allowing subjects to 
communicate under an external regulation in common pool resource experiments.  We are 
motivated to pursue this line of inquiry because of our interest in the relationship between 
informal community efforts to conserve common property resources in the developing world 
and formal regulatory controls to do the same. Villagers in communities like those we visited 
typically interact and cooperate with each other on a variety of community issues. Thus, when   3
examining the effects of external regulation on local natural resource use, it is unreasonable to 
expect that regulations would simply replace non-binding agreements among community 
members. Even under government regulations, community members are likely to interact with 
each other and develop informal norms of behavior. The question that this paper addresses is 
whether these informal norms and formal regulations are complementary institutions for 
conserving local common pool resources.   
Whether communication and regulations are complementary has important implications for 
judging the effectiveness of government interventions in local common pool resource problems. 
Evaluating the performance of an intervention must be done in comparison to the performance 
of existing community conservation efforts, and with the recognition that community members 
will likely continue to pursue informal norms of behavior when the regulation is in place.  
Moreover, since regulatory interventions are costly, they are only justified in locales where the 
regulations will complement existing community efforts.
2   
 The same processes that make communication effective in the absence of regulatory 
controls may also serve to complement, and be complemented by, formal regulations. For 
example, communication can serve as a mechanism to socialize information about the 
efficiency-enhancing goals of a regulation and the formal consequences of noncompliance with 
the regulation. Similarly, a regulation can complement cooperative community efforts if it 
provides a signal of efficient individual behavior that can serve as a focal point for community 
interactions. Moreover, group communication and the enforcement of a formal regulation can 
                                                 
2 Bischoff (2005) is the only other study of which we are aware that combines communication and regulation in 
common pool experiments. Bischoff’s study differs from ours in several ways, but the most important difference is 
that he did not examine whether communication and regulations performed better than communication alone.  In 
fact, he finds that external regulation with communication induced a greater level of cooperation than external 
regulation alone. Although this result is potentially important in some settings, it does not provide the comparison 
between communication under a regulation to communication alone that we feel is the most relevant comparison 
for evaluating the performance of regulatory interventions in local common pool resource problems.      4
provide complementary consequences for over-exploiting the resource. That is, communication 
can support a weak enforcement apparatus by bringing social pressure to bear on individuals to 
achieve more efficient outcomes, and regulatory enforcement provides an explicit sanction for 
noncompliance that may be necessary to support informal verbal agreements.
3   
On the other hand, we recognize that certain kinds of group interactions could lead to worse 
outcomes.  It is possible that community members may implicitly transfer responsibility for 
resource management to the external authority.  For example, group discussions may lead to a 
consensus that group members are in a game against the government, thereby shifting the focus 
away from the benefits of voluntarily coordinating actions. More specifically, communication 
could lead to a focus on the weak consequences of noncompliance with a regulation instead of 
reinforcing its welfare-enhancing objective.  
We test for complementarities between formal regulations and informal non-binding 
communication with a series of common pool resource experiments conducted in three 
geographically distinct fishing areas of Colombia. Although villagers in each of these areas 
depend heavily on the local fishery, these areas are different along several dimensions (which 
we discuss briefly in Section 2).  Rather than use a neutral frame, our experiments were 
explicitly concerned with extraction decisions from a common pool fishery.
 4 Thus, our 
experimental design avoids the problem that individuals in different communities may approach 
                                                 
3 Baland and Platteau (1996) provide a conceptual discussion of potential complementarities between formal and 
informal institutions for managing common pool resources in developing countries. They suggest that such 
complementarities between government and user groups or communities can be exploited in co-management 
arrangements. Also see Bowles and Gintis (2000) and Bowles (2003). 
4 Within their recent taxonomy of field experiments, Harrison and List (2004) would classify our experiments as 
framed field experiments, because they were conducted with a population of subjects for which the phenomenon of 
interest (behavior in a common pool fishery) is also an important element of the subjects’ experiences.    5
a “neutral” or “decontextualized” experiment in different ways.
5 Each group of five subjects 
first played 10 rounds of a baseline open access common pool resource game (without 
communication or regulation), and then 10 additional rounds under one of five institutions: 
face-to-face communication alone, one of two external regulations alone, and communication 
combined with each of the two regulations. The two external regulations consist of an 
individual harvest quota that was set at the level that maximizes a group’s payoff, but differ 
with respect to the level of enforcement. In both cases the level of enforcement was chosen to 
be rather weak, because this is typical of regulatory control of natural resources in the 
developing world.  We conducted the full set of experiments in each area to determine whether 
the results we obtained in one region were replicable in the others.
  
We find no statistically significant differences in individual harvest decisions across the 
regions in the first-stage open access game, but significant regional variation in responses to the 
second-stage institutions. This suggests that the differences in responses to the second-stage 
institutions we observe cannot be due to regional variation in how subjects responded to the 
fundamental common property problem; rather, these differences must be due solely to 
variation in responses to the alternative institutions.   
In all cases, the second stage institutions were effective in reducing harvests from the open 
access baseline. Thus, if we were to judge the performance of each of the regulations with 
respect to the open-access baseline we would conclude that they were effective in each region, 
although not equally so. Again, however, the appropriate comparison is between regulation 
combined with communication and communication alone, and a regulation can only be justified 
                                                 
5 See the Henrich et al. (2005) experiments across 15 small-societies, and the comments by Vernon Smith, 
Randolph Grace and Simon Kemp (among others) in the same volume.  The commentators questioned the neutral 
frame of these experiments because it could have been understood in different ways across the societies. Hence, the 
reported behavioral differences across societies could have been the result of different interpretations of the game 
instead of particular behavioral patterns in each society.    6
if it complements non-binding communication. Our results suggest that the hypothesis of a 
complementary relationship between communication and external regulation is supported for 
some combinations of regions and regulations, but cannot be supported in general. We find a 
complementarity relationship between communication and external regulation in three out of 
the six possible cases. In one case, regulation and communication together led to harvest 
decisions that were no different from those under communication alone. In the remaining two 
cases, regulation combined with communication actually led to greater harvests than 
communication alone, suggesting that the regulation crowded-out cooperative efforts to 
conserve the resource.   
 
2. Experimental Design 
Our experiments are based on the standard problem of individual harvests from a common pool 
resource by n identical individuals. We use a static model similar to that presented by Ostrom, 
Walker and Garden (1994), Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2002), and an earlier model developed 
by Cornes and Sandler (1983).  Individual i harvests xi units up to a capacity constraint  .
max
i x  
Units of harvest sell at a constant price p. The individual’s harvest costs are 
() () ii i ii cx x d x x x −− ++ +, where  ij ji x x − ≠ =∑ , and c and d are positive constants.  The 
individual has an endowment ei. Thus, individual payoffs are: 
[ 1 ]  () () , ii i i i i i i ep xc xx d x xx π −− =+ − + − + subject to  .
max
ii x x ≤  
Maximizing i π with respect to xi, yields i’s Nash best-response function: 
[2] ( ) [( ) / 2 ,   ] i
max
ii i xx m i np c d x dx − − =− − , 
provided that  0 i pcd x − −− > for all feasible  . i x−    7
It is well known that pure Nash strategies result in inefficiently high harvest levels. A 
government authority that imposes and enforces an individual harvest quota could address this 
inefficiency. In this framework, inducing compliance is largely a matter of finding the correct 
expected penalty to reduce harvest levels to the efficient quota. However, this approach ignores 
other factors that may also explain individual compliance decisions. Of particular importance to 
us is how communication may work to support individual compliance with a formal regulation.  
Moreover, individuals may respond to the frame that a regulation provides; that is, that the 
quota provides a signal of efficient harvests, and the expected penalty signals that deviations 
from the quota may be punished.   
Subjects were placed in groups of five and participated in a 20-period common pool 
resource game that was framed as a harvest decision from a shared fishery.
6 Each subject 
received an identical payoff table that was generated from [1] with parameters p = 116.875, c = 
17.875, d = 2.75, ei = 900,  0
min = i x  and 
max 8. i x =
7 With these values the standard symmetric 
Nash equilibrium is achieved when each individual chooses to harvest six units, while the group 
payoff-maximizing individual harvest is one unit. 
Each group played a first stage with 10 rounds of a typical common pool resource game 
without communication or external regulation (Open Access); the second stage consisted of 10 
additional rounds under one of the following institutions: 
•  Face-to-face communication (Communication); 
                                                 
6 Assignment to groups was not completely random. We tried to ensure that relatives were in separate groups. 
7 Experiment instructions and the payoff table are available upon request <ATTACHED AS REVIEWER’S 
APPENDIX>. In the experiments, participants were asked to choose a harvest level between one and nine units, 
instead of between zero and eight units. The reason for this is that the concept of zero harvest is very difficult to 
explain in the field since the participants depend so critically on their use of local natural resources. The payoff 
table they were given was modified to account for this. However, our analysis assumes that individual harvests 
vary from zero and eight.   8
•  External regulation with a low penalty (Low Penalty); 
•  External regulation with a medium penalty (Medium Penalty); 
•  Face-to-face communication with a low penalty external regulation (LP/Com); 
•  Face-to-face communication with a medium penalty external regulation (MP/Com). 
Each treatment was repeated twelve times, with four groups in each of the three regions. In 
the three treatments that allowed communication, participants were free to discuss anything 
related to the experiment prior to making their harvest decisions privately in each round.  For 
the four treatments that involved an external regulation, an individual harvest quota of one unit 
(the efficient individual harvest) was imposed. To enforce the quota, each subject faced an audit 
probability of 10 percent.
8  If an inspection revealed that a subject’s harvest exceeded one, then 
that person incurred a financial penalty; the results of inspections were not made public.  We 
examine two regulations that differ only in the level of the unit penalty for discovered harvests 
that exceeded the quota.  For the Low Penalty and LP/Com treatments, the penalty was 27 pesos 
per unit above the quota. We chose this penalty because the resulting expected marginal penalty 
is not high enough to change the pure Nash strategy equilibrium from the baseline Open Access 
equilibrium of six units for each individual. Nevertheless, such a regulation might serve to 
reduce individual harvests because of the frame the regulation places on the experiment, in 
particular the signal of efficient choices and that deviations from the quota will be sanctioned. 
For the Medium Penalty and MP/Com treatments, the unit penalty was 165 pesos. The Nash 
strategy equilibrium with this penalty is five units for each individual. We chose enforcement 
strategies that were rather weak, at least under a conventional theory of regulatory enforcement, 
                                                 
8  In order to decide who in a group, if anyone, was inspected in a particular round, a ballot was chosen from a bag 
containing five ballots with the participants’ numbers on them and five other blank ballots.   9
because this is likely to be a characteristic of most regulatory controls of resource use in the 
developing world.   
In each round, subjects were asked to choose a harvest level. After all subjects made these 
decisions, the monitor collected this information and announced to the group the aggregate level 
of harvest for that round. With this information, individuals were able to calculate their 
individual payoffs from the level of total harvest by the others.  Individual earnings ranged 
between 11,220 and 22,900 pesos with an average of 15,240 pesos (about US$6.00).
9 Earnings 
were paid in cash at the end of each experiment. Each experiment lasted about three hours.  
Before each experiment began, instructions were read aloud by the monitor and several practice 
rounds that did not count toward final earnings were played to familiarize the participants with 
the experiments.  
The experiments were conducted during the summer of 2004 in three distinct areas of 
Colombia: on the Caribbean Coast, along the Magdalena River, and on the Pacific Coast.  A 
total of 300 individuals participated in the experiments, evenly divided among the three regions. 
Summary statistics of the subjects’ characteristics by region are provided in Table 1. The 
Magdalena and Pacific regions were roughly comparable across all five dimensions: the mean 
age was about 42 with almost five years of formal education.  Subjects in these two regions 
were overwhelmingly male fishermen who had lived in the same community for more than 10 
years. In the Caribbean, subjects were younger and more educated.  There was also a more even 
gender distribution (55 percent male).  Relative to the other two communities, a smaller 
majority of subjects lived in the same community for over 10 years and earned their living 
primarily from fishing.  
                                                 
9 Daily wages in the regions where the experiments were conducted varied between 10,000 and 15,000 pesos.    10
An important element of our design is that all treatments were conducted in each of the three 
regions. Our motivation for doing so was to examine whether the results we obtain in one 
region are replicable in the others, or if there are significant regional differences. Clearly, with 
only three regions, we cannot rigorously link differences in our results across the regions to 
differences in specific regional characteristics. We do, however, discuss how some regional 
characteristics may be related to the experiment outcomes we observe, so a brief description of 
how the regions are different is appropriate.  
Participants in the Pacific region, more specifically the Ensenada de Tumaco, are members 
of Afro-Colombian communities, the majority of whom live in collectively owned territories. In 
the Ensenada de Tumaco, 94 percent of the participants report that fishing, particularly shrimp 
harvesting, is their main livelihood.  Compared to the other two regions, government authorities 
charged with regulating fisheries and other natural resources have a stronger presence in this 
region. Colombian fisheries are regulated by INCODER (Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo 
Rural), a federal level agency under the Ministry of Agricultural Affairs. INCODER enforces 
several regulations on the Pacific Coast, such as seasonal restrictions and the prohibition of 
certain methods of harvesting shrimp. In general, local fishermen in the Ensenada de Tumaco, 
are aware of the regulations they operate under, and there is agreement among them about the 
need to regulate the shrimp fishery. However, they have concerns about particular regulations, 
especially those that involve seasonal fishing restrictions, because of the lack of alternative 
employment opportunities. Community-based organizations, as well as international 
conservation non-governmental organizations, are also actively promoting the conservation of 
the natural resources of the region, in particular the mangrove forests. International conservation 
organizations consider this region a “hot spot” of biodiversity that they believe to be threatened.    11
 
The participants in the town of La Dorada, Caldas, and surrounding villages are part of a 
mostly white and mestizo population who harvest several species of fish from the Magdalena 
River and the adjacent lake, Charca de Guarinocito, in the interior of the country. Eighty-seven 
percent of the participants reported that small-scale fishing was their main economic activity.  
The presence in this area of INCODER is considered to be very weak—participants describe 
regulatory authorities as distant, with no involvement at all with the community.  Nevertheless, 
most of the participants are aware of seasonal restrictions on harvesting certain species. 
International conservation organizations are not present in this area, but a local fishermen’s 
association has been formed to manage the local fishery. In fact, about 20% of the Magdalena 
participants belong to this association, which has been actively designing and enforcing their 
own rules for fishing in the Charca de Guarinocito. 
Participants in the Caribbean region, more specifically near the city of Santa Marta, are part 
of a multiethnic population of whites, mestizos, African descendants, and indigenous peoples. 
The proportion of participants in this region who reported that fishing is their main economic 
activity is significantly lower than in the other two regions (69 percent). Some of the other 
participants are small-scale fish buyers who then re-sell their product in Santa Marta.  The rest 
are farm workers. Generally, the participants did not know who had the authority to regulate the 
local fisheries. However, some methods of fishing are recognized as illegal (e.g., fishing with 
dynamite, minimum mesh size for nets). Fewer other fishing norms (formal or informal) are 
followed in this region.    12
 
3. Results 
To formally test for possible complementarities between formal regulations imposed on a 
community to conserve a local natural resource and non-binding verbal agreements to do the 
same, we use a linear random effects Tobit model to control for individual heterogeneity and to 
reflect the fact that harvest decisions were constrained between zero and eight, inclusive.  We 
estimate individual harvest decisions as a function of a constant (interpreted as the Open Access 
treatment in the first stage) and dummy variables for the five second stage treatments in each of 
the three regions.  The results are presented in Table 2. We also estimated a similar model with 
dummy variables for Open Access in each region and there was no statistically significant 
difference across the regions (p = 0.69).  Under Open Access, average individual harvests in the 
three regions is 4.84 units, which is lower than the Nash equilibrium harvest (six units) but 
higher than efficient harvest (one unit).  This observation is consistent with the results of 
Cardenas et al. (2000, 2002) in other Colombian communities using a similar protocol. What is 
particularly interesting is that the first stage Open Access results are replicated in the three 
regions, yet, as we will see shortly, significant regional differences emerge when we introduce 
the alternative institutions in stage two. This suggests that any differences in stage two results are 
attributable to regional interactions with the different institutions, and not to regional differences 
in the way in which the subject pools responded to the fundamental common pool dilemma. 
As expected, the Communication treatment was effective in reducing harvests relative to 
Open Access in all three regions, although the effect in the Pacific region (–0.98) was much 
lower than in the Magdalena (–2.28) and the Caribbean regions (–1.82). These regional 
differences are jointly significant (p = 0.00), although the effects of Communication in the 
Magdalena and the Caribbean regions are not statistically different (p = 0.18). This regional   13
variation reveals differences in the ability of different groups to form and maintain non-binding 
verbal agreements to conserve the resource. 
 There is also noticeable regional variation in the effects of the Low Penalty. In the 
Caribbean, the reduction in average harvests from Open Access (–0.69) is much lower than in the 
Pacific (–3.47) and on the Magdalena River (–1.88).  These regional differences are jointly 
significant (p = 0.00).  On the other hand, there is no statistically significant difference in the 
effects of the Medium Penalty among the regions (p = 0.29).   
Why is there so much regional variation with the Low Penalty, but none with the Medium 
Penalty? Both treatments frame the experiments by providing a signal of the efficient individual 
harvest choice and by punishing deviations from this choice, but the Medium Penalty regulation 
has a fine for exceeding the harvest quota that is over six times that of the Low Penalty 
regulation. Moreover, the fine for noncompliance in the Low Penalty regulation is so low that, 
at least in theory, it should have no effect on harvest choices, yet in all regions there is a 
statistically significant reduction in harvests with this regulation.  Its effectiveness, therefore, 
must be largely due to the regulatory frame, not the penalty. The regional variation in the effects 
of the Low Penalty suggests that reliance on a simple regulatory frame produces much less 
consistent results. In fact, in the Pacific the framing effect of the Low Penalty yielded a larger 
reduction in harvests than the higher monetary costs associated with the Medium Penalty (–3.47 
vs. –2.05, p = 0.00).  In the Caribbean this relationship was reversed (–0.69 for the Low Penalty 
vs. –1.61 for the Medium Penalty, p = 0.01), and in the Magdalena there was no difference in 
the effects of the two regulations (–1.88 for the Low Penalty vs. –2.12 for the Medium Penalty, 
p = 0.50).  Thus, while both the Low Penalty and the Medium Penalty regulations provide 
signals of efficient harvests and sanctions for deviating from the regulatory quota, the stronger   14
monetary incentive of the Medium Penalty produced consistent reductions in average harvests 
across the regions while the weaker monetary incentive of the Low Penalty did not.  
Overall, then, the regional variation in the responses to the second stage institutions occurs 
with the treatments that rely on framing effects (Low Penalty) or social pressure 
(Communication) to reduce harvests. In contrast, there is no regional variation in the effects of 
the Medium Penalty regulation, which relies instead on a significant monetary incentive for 
violating the regulatory quota to induce more conservative choices.  
Now let us turn to our main hypothesis that communication and regulation are 
complementary institutions. Let us say that communication and a regulation are strong 
complements if combining communication with a regulation produces more conservative 
harvests than either communication or the regulation alone. Of the six possible combinations of 
regions and regulations, only two reveal a strong complementarity between communication and 
regulation. Note from Table 2 that in the Caribbean region the reduction of harvests in the 
LP/Com treatment from Open Access (–3.28) is significantly greater than the reduction achieved 
by both the Communication treatment (–1.82, p = 0.00) and the Low Penalty treatment (–0.69, p 
= 0.00). Thus, Communication and the Low Penalty regulation are strongly complementary in 
the Caribbean. Similarly, Communication and the Medium Penalty regulation are strong 
complements in the Pacific region because the harvest reductions for the MP/Com treatment  
(–2.83) are greater than both the Communication treatment (–0.98, p = 0.00) and Medium 
Penalty treatment (–2.05, p = 0.03).  
However, in practical applications, the strong complementarity criterion may be too strict. 
The villagers that were the subjects in our experiments cooperate with each other on a large 
number of community issues. Thus, it is likely that a regulation to control individual harvests   15
from a local fishery would be implemented in communities that already communicate with each 
other about the fishery, as well as other shared concerns. To judge the performance of a 
regulatory intervention in such a community, it is appropriate for us to ask whether a regulation 
complements existing community efforts, but not vice-versa. Let us say that communication and 
a regulation are weak complements if their combination produces more conservative harvests 
than communication alone. Of the six combinations of regions and regulations, there are three 
such cases. Obviously, if communication and a regulation are strong complements, then they are 
weak complements as well. Thus, we have already identified two of the three cases of weak 
complementarity. The other case is in the Pacific region, where the harvest reduction for the 
LP/Com treatment (–2.81) is greater than for Communication (–0.98, p = 0.00).  
We also observe two cases in which communication combined with a regulation actually led 
to worse outcomes than communication alone. When this occurs, the regulation crowds out 
cooperative efforts to conserve the resource. In the Caribbean region, the MP/Com treatment 
produced a lower reduction in average individual harvests than Communication (–1.17 vs.  
–1.82, p = 0.06).  Similarly, in the Magdalena region the LP/Com treatment yielded a lower 
reduction in harvests than Communication (–1.54 vs. –2.28, p = 0.03). This crowding-out does 
not occur with the Medium Penalty regulation in the Magdalena region. In fact, the reduction in 
average harvests for the MP/Com (–2.63) is not significantly different from the harvest 
reduction for Communication (–2.28, p = 0.32). 
We conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis that informal communication and formal 
regulatory structures are complementary is not supported generally. Of the six possible 
combinations of regions and regulations, we observe a strong complementarity in only two 
instances, and a weak complementarity in one additional case. On the other hand, there are two   16
cases in which a regulation crowds out communication. In the last case, the combination of 
communication and a regulation does not produce a significant difference in average harvests 
than communication alone. Although there are likely to be regions in which regulatory control 
of harvests from a common pool resource complements informal community efforts, our results 
suggest that such a relationship will not be robust across communities and regulations.  
Our results beg the question of why different regions produce different results in the same 
experiments—particularly considering that outcomes under Open Access in all three regions 
were identical. With only three regions, we hesitate to generalize our results too broadly. 
Nevertheless, there may exist a mapping between the relative importance of government 
regulations and informal community efforts in the participants' everyday lives on the one hand 
and our experimental results on the other that is worth exploring with subsequent research.  
Let us compare the Pacific and Magdalena regions.  The subject pools in these two regions 
are very similar in terms of average age, years of formal education, gender composition, and 
livelihood (see Table 1). However, in the Pacific region the federal regulatory authority has the 
strongest presence of the three regions and the participants in the experiments generally agreed 
about the need for such regulations. In contrast, federal regulators have little involvement in the 
Magdalena fishery; instead, a local fishermen’s association designs and enforces informal 
fishing rules. Thus, the relative importance of formal regulations versus informal community 
efforts is significantly higher in the Pacific than in the Magdalena region. Our experiment 
results reveal that, in the Pacific, each of the regulatory institutions performed much better than 
Communication alone. In fact, both the Low Penalty and Medium Penalty regulations 
complemented Communication in this region. In contrast, Communication alone was very 
effective at reducing harvests in the Magdalena region, and was at least as effective as any of   17
the regulatory treatments. Moreover, the Medium Penalty regulation did not complement 
Communication, and the Low Penalty regulation actually crowded out Communication. Thus, a 
comparison between the Pacific and Magdalena regions suggests the intriguing hypothesis that 
the relative importance of government regulations and informal conservation efforts in a 
community may be positively correlated with the likelihood that formal regulations can 
complement informal community efforts.  
The connection between the relative importance of regulations versus community efforts 
and the results of our experiments is not as clear in the Caribbean. In this region there is both 
minimal regulatory pressure and no clear community efforts to conserve the fishery. In addition, 
the subject pool in the Caribbean was significantly different from those in the Pacific and the 
Magdalena regions. In particular, fewer of the subjects earned their living primarily through 
fishing and fewer lived in the community for over 10 years (see Table 1).  With a less stable 
population that is less concentrated on fishing, it is possible that these subjects are less vested in 
the local fishery, resulting in a weaker mapping of the context of their everyday lives into the 
experimental results.  
However, the fact that Communication and the Low Penalty regulation are strongly 
complementary in the Caribbean region, while the Medium Penalty regulation crowds out 
Communication, is consistent with Ostrom’s (2000) hypothesis about the crowding out 
phenomenon. Ostrom suggests that a regulation with a modest degree of external enforcement 
discourages the formation of social norms and encourages players to cheat the system, whereas 
in situations with poorly enforced regulations, social norms evolve to support cooperation. This 
is exactly what we observed in the Caribbean: however, since we only observe this phenomenon 
in this region, we must conclude that it is not likely to be robust across communities.   18
4. Concluding Remarks 
The primary message of this work is a cautionary note concerning the performance of 
government interventions in small-scale resource industries in the developing world. Although 
each of the regulatory interventions we studied was effective at inducing more conservative 
harvests than under an open access scenario, this comparison is not the most relevant one for 
evaluating government intervention in common pools in the developing world. In most of these 
cases, regulatory interventions will be imposed on communities of resource users that already 
have informal norms about individual behavior in the commons, albeit with widely varying 
degrees of success. Thus, the relevant measure of the performance of a regulatory intervention 
is not how it performs with respect to the theoretical open access situation, but how it performs 
relative to existing informal conservation efforts that stem from communication and 
organization at the community level that may or may not continue once a regulation is in place.  
With regard to this comparison, we observe that regulatory interventions sometimes do more 
harm than good, are sometimes completely ineffective, and at other times complement existing 
community efforts. Since regulatory interventions are costly, they are only warranted in those 
communities where there is a strong likelihood that the intervention complements existing 
community efforts.  
  Identifying these communities calls for more intense study of the determinants of 
community responses to regulatory intervention. Geographical variation in the effectiveness of 
regulatory interventions could reflect existing behavioral patterns under current regulations, 
relationships with government authorities, and patterns of cooperation among community 
members to conserve a local resource (Henrich et al. 2004, Cardenas and Ostrom 2004).  
Clearly, further research is needed to explore how community and individual characteristics can   19
explain variation in the responses to alternative institutions. Obviously, this requires visiting 
many more communities than we were able to. Yet, a clearer understanding of the relationships 
between community and individual characteristics and behavior in common pool experiments 
will provide valuable information about exploiting possible complementarities between 
community-based initiatives and external regulations, and thus help in the design of better 
policies to effectively and efficiently reduce overexploitation of common property resources in 
the developing world.  
Finally, we think that our study highlights and clarifies the value of conducting framed field 
experiments. As we have stated several times, our broader interest is in the performance of 
regulatory interventions in small-scale resource industries in the developing world. Thus, rather 
than trying to address this issue with students in university labs, it is appropriate that we 
traveled to a developing country and conducted experiments that presented a common pool 
dilemma to individuals whose livelihood is tied to a common pool resource. The advantage of 
such framed field experiments is that subjects bring a context from their daily lives that could 
influence their experiment behavior, and that context is an important element of the question 
that is being addressed.  The regional heterogeneity of the responses to the institutions we 
examined in our experiments drives our main result about the non-robustness of a 
complementary relationship between communication and external regulations. If we had used 
university students, we would have run the substantial risk of missing the heterogeneity that is 
so obviously important in the field.  
However, the heterogeneity we observe not only highlights the value of framed field 
experiments, but also implies that the field itself is a heterogeneous, and often challenging, 
place in a way that the lab is not. Indeed, our results are a cautionary tale for anyone who   20
contemplates field experiments. If we had attempted to draw conclusions about the performance 
of regulatory institutions in small-scale fisheries in the developing world from experiments 
conducted in only one region of Colombia, then the results would have been just as misleading 
as the results from the same experiments conducted in a lab with university students. Hence, the 
value of field work like ours does not come from simply designing framed experiments to 
examine behavior by individuals who are intimately connected to the questions of interest, 
although in cases like ours this is surely important. Replication in as many of the relevant 
settings as possible is equally important.   21
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Subject Characteristics 
 
Subject Characteristics  N  Caribbean N  Magdalena N Pacific 
Mean Age (years)  100  35.6  100  42.4  98  42.3 
Mean years of formal education  97  6.3  100  4.7  93  4.7 
Percent Male  100  55%  100  83%  100  89% 
Percent who have lived in the 
same community for 10 years or 
more. 
100 78% 100 93%  98  95% 
Percent for whom fishing is 
their main activity   90 69% 98 87% 98  94% 
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Table 2: Random Effects Tobit Models of Individual Harvests 
 
Variable  Coefficient 
Constant (Open Access) 4.84 *** (0.08) 
Caribbean Region   
Communication   –1.82 *** (0.25) 
Low Penalty   –0.69 *** (0.25) 
Low Penalty × Communication (LP/Com) 
–3.28 *** (0.25) 
 
Medium Penalty   –1.61 *** (0.25) 
Medium Penalty ×  Communication (MP/Com)  –1.17 *** (0.25) 
Magdalena Region   
Communication  –2.28 *** (0.25) 
Low Penalty  –1.88 *** (0.25) 
Low Penalty × Communication (LP/Com)  –1.54 *** (0.25) 
Medium Penalty  –2.12 *** (0.25) 
Medium Penalty × Communication (MP/Com)  –2.63 *** (0.25) 
Pacific Region   
Communication  –0.98 *** (0.25) 
Low Penalty   –3.47 *** (0.25) 
Low Penalty × Communication (LP/Com)  –2.81 *** (0.25) 
Medium Penalty   –2.05 *** (0.25) 






The dependent variable is the individual’s harvest and the constant is interpreted as average harvests under Open 
Access. Asterisks reflect p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors (reported in parenthesis) are the same for the dummy variables 
for the five second stage treatments in each of the three regions because there are equal numbers of observations in 
each of these treatments.  23
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Reviewer’s Appendix: Experiment Instructions
10 
 
Stage 1: Open Access Treatment (Open Access) 
Before we begin, we want to thank you all for accepting this invitation and participating in this 
exercise. The objective of this exercise is to understand how people make decisions related to the 
use of a shared natural resource. All the decisions you make, as well as all the other information 
you will provide us, will remain confidential. We will not divulge your individual decisions to 
any other member of the community, nor to any other person. 
 
Introduction 
The exercise in which you are going to participate can be different from other exercises in which 
members of your community might have participated in the past, therefore, any comment that 
you might have heard about the exercise does not necessarily apply to the version in which you 
will participate. 
 
This exercise is similar to a situation in which a group of people have to make decisions on how 
to use a shared natural resource. For example, a forest, a drinking water source, or a fishing area. 
In this experiment, the resource will be referred as a fishery. 
 
You have been selected to participate in a group of 5 people. Today, there are 3 groups 
participating at the same time. However, each group is independent and the decisions of the other 
groups do not affect the decisions of your group. Each group will be differentiated by the color 
of the sheets used during the exercise.  
 
In this exercise you will earn money depending on your decisions and the decisions of the other 
members of your group. The reason why we use money in this exercise is to represent real life 
situations in which your economic decisions will bring yourself monetary consequences. You 
will play several rounds equivalent, for example, to periods such as years, months, or fishing 
seasons. 
 
In each round, you will earn a number of points that will be equivalent to a number of pesos. At 
the end of the exercise, we will sum the total number of pesos earned in all the rounds, we will 
round the total earned, and we will personally hand that to you in cash. 
 
We will now explain how to participate in the exercise. Please pay a lot of attention to the 
instructions. If you understand the instructions, you will be able to make better decisions in the 
exercise. Please, remain seated and do not speak with other participants. If you have a question, 
raise you hand. The assistant will answer your question in private. 
 
Earnings Table 
We will now hand out the EARNINGS TABLE which contains all the information you will need 
to make your decisions in this exercise.  
 
                                                 
10 Thanks to Juan Camilo Osorio for translating the instructions from Spanish to English.   26
All participants have the same EARNINGS TABLE that you do. The numbers in the table are 
points equivalent to the pesos you can earn in each round, depending on both what you decide to 
extract and the decisions made by others in your group.  
 
In each round you have to decide how many units of the resource you will extract. We will call 
your decision “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION.” These units correspond to the columns 1 to 9 
in the EARNING TABLE. In this exercise, each participant can extract a maximum of 9 units, 
and a minimum of 1. 
 
In the EARNINGS TABLE, the decisions of the other members of your group correspond to the 
column “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”, which will be a number between 4 and 36. 
This number is the sum of the units extracted by the other members of the group. In other words, 
“LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS” is equal to: the total extraction of the whole group, 
minus the amount you extracted. When you make your decision, you will not know the decisions 
made by the other members of your group.  
 
Once all participants hand in their decisions, we will sum all the levels of extraction and 
will announce the group’s TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION. With this information you will 
be able to calculate the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS,” which is equal to the 
“TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” minus “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”. 
 
Let’s see some examples so that you can understand how to use the EARNINGS TABLE. 
 
Imagine you decide that “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” is 4 units, and that the other 
members of the group extract 4 units each.  We will announce that the TOTAL level of 
extraction is 20 units. Since you decided to extract 4, you can calculate the “LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION OF OTHERS,” which is equal to the “TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” 
minus “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”. In this case, the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF 
OTHERS” is 20 – 4 = 16 units. Thus, as seen in the table, your earnings will be 859.  
 
In the previous example all the members of the group picked the same level of extraction. 
However, each person can pick a different number. For example, if you choose 4 and the other 
members of the group extract 2, 3, 7 and 8, we will announce that the TOTAL level of extraction 
is 24. Given the fact that you decided to extract 4, the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF 
OTHERS” will be 20. In other words, the “TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION (24) minus 
“MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” (4). In this case, as seen on the table, your earnings will be 
754. 
 
The EARNINGS TABLE has an additional table called “Average of others”. This column 
indicates you the average decision of your group for a determined level. For example, if the 
others extract 8, this means that the average amount extracted per person is 2. Instead, if the 
others extract 20, the average amount extracted per person is 5.  
 
Take a few seconds to look at the EARNINGS TABLE and understand how it works. If you have 
any questions, please raise your hand and someone will come to you.  
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Decision Card 
I will now explain how you will inform us in each round your level of extraction. In each round 
















In each round you will have to write: 
- The number of the round, which will be announced by us. 
-“MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”, in other words, how many units will you extract, which in 
this case will be a number between 1 and 9.  
-You also have to write what you think the other members of your group will extract. 
 
This is the sum of the levels of extraction that you think the other 4 members of your group will 
extract. This sum is a number between 4 and 36. Remember that when you make your decision 
you do not know what the others are choosing. However, we want to know how much you think 
the others will extract. For example, if you think that two people will choose 3 and the other two 
5, then, what you think the others will extract is 16 (3 +3+ 5 + 5).  
 
What you write on the level of extraction of others will not affect your earnings, either if it is 
equal or different to what actually happened. However, we are interested to know what you are 
thinking about the level of extraction of the others when you make your choice. 
 
After all the members of your group have made their decisions, we will pick up the 5 
participants’ cards and calculate the groups’ TOTAL level of extraction. Once we announce the 
total extraction of the group you will be able to calculate the true “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION 
OF OTHERS.” With this information and your level of extraction, you will be able to calculate 
how much you earned by looking at the EARNINGS TABLE.  
 
It is very important that you remember that your decisions are private and that you can not show 






Participant Number:   
Round Number:   
My level of extrac1tion: 
(a number between 1 – 9):   
How much do you think 
others will extract? 
(a number between 4 – 36): 
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Calculation sheet 
Each one of you will receive a calculation sheet with which you record your decisions and 
earnings. Please write your participant number in the calculation sheet. This is the same number 
that is written in the decision cards.  
 
Let’s see how to use the calculation sheet by looking at an example. Suppose you decided to 
extract 4 units. In consequence, you have to write 4 under column A of the calculation sheet, as 
shown in the example. You should also write this number in “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” 
in the Decision Card .You are writing your decision in two places, in the Decision Card, which 
you will hand in back to us, and in the calculations sheet. Please, check that you have written the 
same number in the two sheets before you hand in the decision card.  
 
After all the members of the group have finished taking their decisions, we will pick up the cards 
of the 5 participants and calculate the groups’ TOTAL level of extraction.  
 
Suppose the “TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” is 20 units. You should write 20 in the 
column B in the calculations sheet. In order to calculate accurately the “LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION OF OTHERS,” you should subtract Column A (“MY LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION”) from Column B (“TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”) You should write 
the result in Column C (“LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”) In our example, the 
“LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS” is 16 (20 – 4.) 
 
In order to calculate your earnings, you should use the EARNINGS TABLE. In this case, given 
that “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” is 4 and the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS” 
is 16, then your earnings will be 859. This is the information you should write in column D.   
 
Practice rounds 
Before we begin the exercise we will do some practice rounds. The decisions that you take in 
these practice rounds would not affect your earnings today. 
 
The first practice round will be done altogether. First, write the number of the round in the 
decision card, in this case (P) of practice. After that, looking at the EARNINGS TABLE suppose 
that each one of you picked 5. Write this in the decision card and in Column A of the earnings 
sheet. You should also write in the decision card what you think the other members of your 
group will extract. In this case, it is 20, because we know that all of them picked 5. Remember, 
when we begin the real exercise, you will not know the exact number of extraction of the other 
members while you will be picking your level of extraction. In the next rounds you will write 
what you think the others will extract.  
 
Given that all the members of the group picked 5 in this example, the total level of extraction for 
the group is 25. Each one should write now 25 under Column B (“TOTAL LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION”) in the calculations sheet. 
 
Now subtract “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” (5) from the “TOTAL LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION” (25). In other words, column B minus Column A. This operation is equal to 20. 
This number is the true “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”, which you should write in   29
Column C. Using the number in Column A, “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION,” and the number 
under column C, the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”, you should use the earnings 
table to determine your earnings for this round. In this case, your earnings will be 790. Write 
your earnings in column D. 
 
We did this example and the previous one supposing that everyone picked the same level of 
extraction. However, when you make your decision, you may choose the level of extraction that 
you want by looking at the EARNINGS TABLE. Are there any questions? 
 
Let’s continue with the next practice round. First, write down the round’s name in the decision 
card, in this case (P) of practice. Now, each one of you has to decide your level of extraction 
using the EARNINGS TABLE. Write it down in the decision card and in Column A in the 
calculations sheet. Before you hand in the decision card, check that the number in column A is 
equal to the one you wrote in “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” in the decision card. You 
should also write in the decision card the level of extraction that you believe the other members 
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Stage 2 – Communication Treatment (Communication) 
 
We now will begin the second part of this exercise. This part is very similar to the previous one, 
with the difference that in the next rounds you will be able to communicate with the other 
members of your group. 
 
At the beginning of each round, before you decide how much you will extract, you will have 5 
minutes to discuss the exercise with the other members of your group. During these 5 minutes, 
you will be able to discuss with them anything related with the exercise. Before the discussion 
round begins, turn your calculations sheet upside down and leave it on the table. After 5 minutes, 
the discussion will come to an end and you will return to your seat to decide privately what your 
level of extraction decision will be.  
 
 
Stage 2 – Mid Penalty Treatment (Medium Penalty) 
 (These are the instructions for the medium penalty of 165.  The instructions for the low penalty 
treatment are identical, except that the penalty for each additional unit extracted is 27). 
 
We will now begin the second part of this exercise. This part is very similar to the previous one, 
with the difference that in the next rounds we will establish a regulation.  The objective of this 
regulation is to make all participants of your group extract 2 units. 
 
In order to promote that people do not extract more than 2 units of the resource, we are going to 
impose a penalty of 165 points for each additional unit extracted. The table that we will be 
handing out summarizes the total penalties that result from each level of extraction.  
 




My level of 
extraction  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Penalty  0  0  165 330 495 660 825 990  1155
 
You will have to pay the penalty only if you are inspected when extracting more than 2 units of 
the resource. In other words, you can extract more than 2 units, but if you are inspected, you will 
have to pay the penalty. However, it will be very difficult to inspect the decisions of all the 
members of the group. 
 
In consequence, once each person decides their level of extraction (a number between 1 and 9) 
and has handed in the decision card, we will randomly pick who will be inspected.  
 
In order to decide who will be inspected, we will take a ballot from a bag containing 5 ballots 
with the participants’ numbers on them, and 5 other blank ballots. 
   31
(Show the ballots) 
 
This implies that for each round you have ONE chance in 10 of being inspected. If your number 
is selected and you extracted more than 2 units of the resource, then you will have to pay the 
penalty for every additional unit. Nobody else will ever know the result of such inspection. If a 
blank ballot is selected, no one will be inspected. 
 
(Practice picking the ballot) 
 
In each round we will only take one ballot. The selected ballot will be returned to the bag. This 
means that the result of the inspection in this round will not affect the result of the next one.  In 
this way, someone can be inspected more than one time during the exercise. It is also possible 
that you never get inspected. 
 
 
Let’s make some examples: 
For example, if you extract 5 units of the resource, your level of extraction is 3 units greater than 
the permitted level of 2 units. 
If your number is randomly selected from the bag, then you will be inspected. Since you 
extracted 5 units, the penalty will be 495, as can be seen in the penalty table (5–2=3 and 
3*165=495). In consequence, we will have to subtract 495 from your earnings.  
If a blank ballot is selected nobody will be inspected and we will follow on to the next 
round. If you are not inspected, you will not have to pay any penalty. 
 
Another example: 
If you extract 2 units, your level of extraction is equal to the level permitted.  If your number is 
randomly selected from the bag, you will be inspected. Given the fact that your level of 
extraction is equal to the permitted level, then you will not have to pay the penalty. If a blank 
ballot is selected, nobody will be inspected and we will pass to the next round. If you are not 
inspected, you will not have to pay the penalty. 
 
Calculation sheet 
The calculation sheet for these rounds is very similar to the one used in the previous rounds, but 
includes some changes.  
Before we begin, please write your participant’s number in the new calculation sheet. 
Columns A, B and C are used as in previous rounds. In column D you must write your 
earnings before you know if you will be inspected. Now, there are two additional columns. In 
column E you must write whether you were inspected or not in each round. Write YES or NO. In 
column F we will write the total value of the penalty you will have to pay if you are inspected. If 
you were not inspected, please write 0 in this column. In the last column, column G, you can 
write your earnings after the inspection.  Earnings after the inspection are calculated subtracting 
the value of the penalty (column F) from the earnings before the inspection (column D). If you 
were not inspected, or your penalty is 0, your earnings (column G) will be exact to what was 
written in column D (My earnings before the inspection).  
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Let’s see some examples: 
Suppose that your level of extraction was 5 units and the total level of extraction was 17 units. 
Write this information in the corresponding columns as in the previous rounds. In this case, level 
of extraction of the others is 12 (column C) and your earnings will be 1021, before the 
inspection. 
 
If your number is randomly selected from the bag, then you will be inspected. Write “YES” in 
column E. Since you extracted 5 units, the penalty will be 495, as you can see in the penalty table 
(5–2 =3 and 3*165=495.) Write 495 in column F (total penalty value.) In consequence, your total 
earnings for this round will be 1021 (column D) – 495 (column F) = 526. Write 526 in the last 
column (My earnings after the inspection, column G.) 
 
If a blank ballot is selected and nobody is inspected we will pass the following round. You will 
not have to pay any penalty. Write NO in column E, 0 in column F (penalty value) and write 




Stage 2 – Mid Penalty and Communication Treatment ( MP/Com) 
These instructions are identical to the medium penalty treatment explained above, except 
that after the practice rounds are over, participants are informed that communication is allowed 
as in the communication treatment. The instructions for the low penalty and communication 
treatment are identical, except that the penalty for each additional unit extracted is 27. 
   33
EARNINGS TABLE  
  My level of extraction   
Level of 
extraction 




4  900  996  1087  1172 1252  1326  1395 1458  1516 1.0 
5  882  976  1064  1146 1223  1295  1361 1421  1476 1.3 
6  864  955  1040  1120 1194  1263  1326 1384  1436 1.5 
7  846  934  1017  1094 1165  1231  1292 1347  1396 1.8 
8  829  914  994  1068 1137  1200  1258 1310  1357 2.0 
9  811  893  970  1042 1108  1168  1223 1273  1317 2.3 
10  793  873  947  1016 1079  1137  1189 1236  1277 2.5 
11  775 852  923 989  1050  1105  1154  1198  1237  2.8 
12  757 831  900 963  1021  1073  1120  1161  1197  3.0 
13  739 811  877 937  992  1042  1086  1124  1157  3.3 
14  721 790  853 911  963  1010  1051  1087  1117  3.5 
15  703 769  830 885  934 978  1017  1050  1077  3.8 
16  686 749  807 859  906 947  983  1013  1038  4.0 
17  668 728  783 833  877 915  948  976  998  4.3 
18  650 708  760 807  848 884  914  939  958  4.5 
19  632 687  736 780  819 852  879  901  918  4.8 
20  614 666  713 754  790 820  845  864  878  5.0 
21  596 646  690 728  761 789  811  827  838  5.3 
22  578 625  666 702  732 757  776  790  798  5.5 
23  560 604  643 676  703 725  742  753  758  5.8 
24  543 584  620 650  675 694  708  716  719  6.0 
25  525 563  596 624  646 662  673  679  679  6.3 
26  507 543  573 598  617 631  639  642  639  6.5 
27  489 522  549 571  588 599  604  604  599  6.8 
28  471 501  526 545  559 567  570  567  559  7.0 
29  453 481  503 519  530 536  536  530  519  7.3 
30  435 460  479 493  501 504  501  493  479  7.5 
31  417 439  456 467  472 472  467  456  439  7.8 
32  400 419  433 441  444 441  433  419  400  8.0 
33  382 398  409 415  415 409  398  382  360  8.3 
34  364 378  386 389  386 378  364  345  320  8.5 
35  346 357  362 362  357 346  329  307  280  8.8 
36  328 336  339 336  328 314  295  270  240  9.0 
 
 
 
 
 